These results echo findings reported last month by John Burn-Murdoch of the Financial Times, showing a rising fertility gap between young progressives and conservatives in rich countries. The difference was modest before 1990, but has widened to 0.6 of a child in America and 0.4 of a child across these advanced societies. In a similar vein, since 2010 the fertility gap between religious and non-religious women under 45 has increased considerably. American women who attend church regularly now have almost one more child, on average, than those with no religious affiliation.
Might we go further and identify the rise of “woke” politics — equal outcomes and emotional harm protection for women and minorities — as a factor in the post-2010 decline in fertility in the Anglosphere and Scandinavia? Second-wave feminism argued that the institution of the family oppressed women and reproduced the patriarchy. Some called for sisterhood and political lesbianism. Social media allowed these radical ideas to flow off campus into mainstream media and youth culture. Radical feminism was a key component of the “Great Awokening” alongside critical race and gender ideology, and reached fever pitch in the aftermath of the #MeToo movement.
The share of women under 30 identifying as bisexual soared in this period: in the American General Social Survey (GSS), it leapt from under 5% in 2010 to over 25% in 2022. According to Gallup, 31% of Generation Z women now identify as LGBT. In the Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression (FIRE) student surveys, non-heterosexual identification is strongly linked to identifying as very liberal. Even controlling for ideology, non-heterosexuality is connected to progressive views such as endorsing the shouting down of offensive speakers on campus.