The First World War generated profound and widespread change throughout society on a scale not experienced since the French Revolution. In the aftermath, the map of the world was redrawn, shell-shocked soldiers made their way home (or, in too many cases, didn’t), and societies everywhere tried to make sense of a world that no longer seemed to follow the laws of reason. In British politics, the years after the war witnessed the collapse of the Liberal Party, the dominant institution of Britain’s left, and its replacement by the Labour Party, which continues to be the principal party opposing the Conservatives today. On the eve of the war in 1914, the Liberal Party controlled the British government, holding 216 seats in Parliament; by 1935 that number had dwindled to “a score” of seats, and it has not recovered since. Whether the war caused such a radical loss of stature directly, merely accelerated it, or was fatal only because of the Party’s already unstable condition is a question historians have debated since the Liberal Party’s demise. Although the Party was experiencing some troubles before the war, and might have

Shaina Wright is a Junior at Horace Greeley High School in Chappaqua, New York, where she wrote this paper for Mr. Steven Houser’s AP European History course in the 2003-2004 academic year.
eventually declined in power, the war and the changes it brought were the worst possible events for the Liberal Party at that time; they magnified every pre-war problem exponentially and left the party with few viable options for recovery. Economic change led to increased class conflict, fighting a war caused contradictions in Liberal ideology, and the Party itself split, fragmenting what had been a strong, unified leadership. All of these factors combined to assure the downfall of the Liberal Party in post-war England.

Background

The British Liberal Party grew in power with the rise of the working class in the 19th century. It painted itself as the progressive party, the modern party, the people’s party, allying itself with workers, capitalists, and Nonconformists. The Party supported Irish home rule, social reform (to a finite extent), and based itself on a fairly pacifist ideology. Its opposition, the Conservative Party, was the champion of the British right; it stood for the Anglican Church, British rule over Ireland (and in general, all of the Empire’s colonies), and advocated increasing Britain’s military expenditures.

The Liberal Party was at its height from 1850 to 1910. Though the Party had experienced some troubles in 1885 and 1905, it appeared to have fully recovered with a series of victories from 1906-1910. However, as those who believe that the Liberal Party’s fate was sealed with or without a war often cite, it again experienced difficulties from 1911-1914. The House of Lords, the perpetual enemy of the Liberal Party, was being “intransigent,” the country was experiencing widespread industrial unrest, suffragettes were marching in the streets, and the situation in Ireland was becoming increasingly heated. However, these troubles did seem to be passing: the House of Lords had been subdued by public disapproval of their actions, the wave of strikes was “receding,” and the question of the suffragettes and possibly even the dilemma in Ireland were beginning to appear as situations that
could be resolved fairly peacefully. In short, Britain was experiencing a period of “unrest, but no anarchy.” The Liberal Party was experiencing some difficulties, as all political institutions do, but it was by no means incapacitated. Had the First World War not broken out, it is of course possible that the Liberal Party might eventually have withered away, but the war was caused by external factors, outside of the Liberal Party’s control, and there is little chance that the Party would have experienced such stress from domestically generated problems.

Economic Changes

The Liberal Party’s primary constituency was drawn both from capitalists and from their workers—clearly a potential source of problems. Before the war, however, the Party mostly managed to avoid the conflicts of interest that could easily arise from such a situation. By contrast to many continental European economies, in England industrialists and labor were allied within the Liberal Party. At the beginning of the war, skilled workers comprised 38% of British manual workers, semiskilled workers 49%, and unskilled workers only 13%. The high percentage of skilled workers, especially in areas such as shipbuilding, coal mining, textiles, and engineering meant that manufacturers generally relied more on artisan labor than on advanced machinery which could be operated by less skilled workers. Since the production process was so dependent on highly-trained laborers, manufacturers were less able to replace those laborers, and so were less apt to act in ways that would cause unions to strike or workers to move to another factory.

Factory owners were also reluctant to enter into conflict with their workers due to the strength of unions during the pre-war years; from 1888 to 1910, worker organization in the aforementioned sectors increased from 10% to nearly 30%. Faced with well organized labor, businessmen were loathe to embroil themselves in potentially long and costly battles with unions to bring down the
cost of labor. They instead allied with their workers to lobby for free trade, part of the Liberal Party’s core platform, as their means of increasing their profits.

Employers operating on this theory were more willing to concede political rights to worker organizations, as they ran their businesses in cooperation with them, not in opposition. The Liberal Party was thus able to make enough concessions to satisfy workers, and in most cases those manning England’s factories didn’t feel the need to turn to Labour for representation, or to form Social Democrat parties, as many of their European counterparts were doing. Many social reforms were indeed instituted by Liberals before the war. Perhaps the most important of these was made soon after the Liberals regained power in the landslide election of 1906, when they nullified the impact of the Taff Vale Judgement, which had made unions liable for damages incurred during strikes. Through reforms such as these, the Party largely managed to retain workers’ support, despite the efforts of groups such as the Labor Representation Committee to gain the favor of the working class.

After the war, however, the Liberal Party was unable to straddle this divide. Though unions grew in membership during the war (from 4.1 to 6.5 million) and reached a peak of 8.3 million in 1920, these gains were rapidly lost when England’s brief postwar boom ended. Loss of demand for its products overseas and the Bank of England’s effort to return to the gold standard wreaked havoc on Britain’s economy, leading to a rise in unemployment to over 2 million workers in December of 1921, accompanied by a corresponding drop in union membership. The effects of this deflation of union strength are clearly seen: “In only one year after 1919 did the number of strikes that ended in victory for employers not greatly exceed [those] that were classified as worker victories,” and the two most important union efforts of the 1920s, the Triple Alliance of 1921 and the General Strike of 1926 were disastrous setbacks for the labor movement. Facing weakened unions, employers no longer feared angering their workers, and found that it was cheaper and easier to reduce labor
costs than to lobby the British government to change its finance policy. Instead, they began to lobby for the return of old laws to help keep the unions weak.\textsuperscript{17}

Unfortunately for the Liberal Party, this cleavage of British society along class lines left them stranded in the middle, caught between two contradictory interests. Liberal politicians could not join sides with workers because they relied on industrialists for their funding, and even had they been able to afford offending their wealthier supporters, many of them were disconcerted by the increasingly socialist leanings of labor. However, they still needed the votes of the working class. The Liberal Party was torn as employers called for cuts in social spending, claiming that the economic problems Britain was experiencing stemmed from the high costs of labor and the power of unions, while workers understandably opposed any such laws.\textsuperscript{18} With the Liberal Party uncertain of which side to support, employers turned increasingly to Conservatives, and trade unions lined up behind a now shrilly anticapitalist Labour Party.\textsuperscript{19}

The war also caused another, more subtle shift in the mindset of British workers. First, the war caused Britain to become a more homogeneous nation; regional identities, which had worked to the Liberal Party’s benefit, were partly discarded, and new class identities were strengthened when wartime production demands led to “an influx of English miners into the coalfields of industrial South Wales and of English labourers into the shipbuilding yards of the Clyde.”\textsuperscript{20} As workers with strong regional ties were removed from their homelands and set to labor together with other workers, socialism and ideas of class consciousness began to spread, and workers became less content with supporting the same party as their employers, who were now increasingly perceived as a group different, and potentially hostile, to their own.

Men who fought in the war also came back with changed beliefs. World War I caused great upheaval throughout European society, and as World War II helped to spark the movement for racial equality, so too did its predecessor cause hope and desire for change in social relations. Jason, a British socialist writing in 1918,
voiced the changed expectations of workers who had fought in the war: “Behind it all there is this fatal confusion of means and ends, and the nations that are paying for that confusion with their blood and sacrificing everything to prevent this philosophy from overpowering the world are beginning to look more closely into their own civilization. We who are sparing no effort to save Europe from the creed that says that no human rights count against military power, are beginning to attach a new value to those rights that we have been ready to surrender to industrial power.”

Jason’s words are an example of the optimism, hope for social change, and raised expectations some workers felt after the war, which the Liberal Party was simply unable to fulfill.

**Ideological Issues**

Fighting a war was uniquely problematic to the Liberal Party for several reasons. What had been the Party’s greatest strengths during peacetime became debilitating liabilities when it found itself fighting a war. A core group of the Party’s supporters were Nonconformists (those who didn’t follow the Anglican Church), most of whom were committed pacifists. Naturally, this led to great turmoil when fighting the largest war the world had yet witnessed. Those opposed to violence felt especially trapped because much as they felt that war was ethically wrong, they had to concede that the cause soldiers were battling for was well-founded. This left them unable to condemn the war, but still uncomfortable condoning it. Some maintained doggedly that war was never right no matter what the situation, for as the British Weekly stated on August 6, 1914, “We of the Free Churches are bound under most tremendous penalties to set the example of peace and goodwill.”

Others rather helplessly suggested, “praying for the destruction of the Germans,” while another group thought that circumstances demanded discarding pacifism entirely and devoting all resources to the defeat of Germany.
The outbreak of war left Nonconformists, a politically active, thoughtful, prominent group of people, divided and purposeless. Prior to 1914, Nonconformists had been motivated by the common objectives of social reform and peace (many were involved in the effort to alleviate the building tension and accompanying arms race) and when the war they had struggled so diligently to prevent finally occurred, they became disoriented and without a cause. This sudden loss of stature and certainty was embodied by J. Allen Baker, “a leading Quaker, a London social reformer, and a Liberal M.P.,”24 who had dedicated himself to diplomacy and peacekeeping, in the process of which he had “travelled widely and been welcomed by the Kaiser, the American President, and the British Foreign Secretary.” This important, dynamic figure was made suddenly obsolete in 1914, left for the next four years to watch powerlessly the failure of all he had worked for, the destruction of his ideals, and to die, “heartbroken and almost forgotten” in 1918. Baker’s plight parallels that of Nonconformism in general; having spent years energetically pursuing diplomatic solutions, and adamantly maintaining the efficacy of these methods, they were faced with the sudden evaporation of the peace process in August 1914, and worse yet, after the German invasion of Belgium, very few of them felt they could even argue that the war was wrong, or violence unnecessary.

Religion was not the only area in which the British Liberal Party faced ideological contradictions. Like any party on the left of the political spectrum, Liberals saw themselves as socially progressive and as the protectors of individual rights. War, however, especially on such a colossal scale, tends to demand the sacrifice of those rights which the Liberals had defended so ardently during the previous decades. As the Party in control of the British government, the awkward decision of exactly how far to intrude upon individual rights was in the Liberals’ hands, and the issue proved as divisive to the Party as a whole as the simple participation of Britain had been to the Nonconformists. Also as England’s pacifists had, the Liberals felt politically trapped, unable to stand in the middle and do nothing, but unable to make a move to either side.25
Issues such as increased state direction of the economy, coercion of trade unions, enemy aliens, conscription and the punishment of conscientious objectors, all of which the Liberal Party would traditionally have opposed, now seemed necessary to support England’s all-consuming war effort. And traditional Liberal policies, such as free trade, no longer seemed practicable, nor did it seem conditions would change after the war’s end. While a large portion of the Party’s established platform was directly contradicted by the war, much of the rest was simply made irrelevant. With the nation’s young men dying in faraway trenches, temperance, religious education, Ireland, and Welsh Church disestablishment, matters which had previously been rallying cries for Liberals, no longer seemed nearly as important. The Party made one attempt to advance temperance during the war, which “failed miserably,” and went so far as to allow an Education Act, which provided for religious education of a traditional, rather than Nonconformist slant, and would have resulted in storms of denominational rage during the prewar years, to pass without a murmur in 1918.

Liberal politicians believed the destruction of their economic and social policies to be directly caused by war. Lord Murray of Elibank wrote that, “Personally, I think that as the Emperor William has been responsible for our adopting conscription, so may he be responsible for our changing all our tariff traditions and our adopting a commercial Imperial federation working in association with the Allied Powers.” Such a reversal of position, however, meant the loss of a cohesive Liberal platform. Before 1914, the Party had stood unified in favor of free trade, Nonconformity, pacifism, and individual rights. Under the pressures of war, these fundamentals of Liberalism had been inverted so that the Party was now somehow advocating traditionally Conservative beliefs. Some dismayed Liberals even went so far as to compare this reversal of positions to the authoritarian government of Germany. “The system of conscription, like the system of Tariff Protection, with which it is closely allied, is in every country where it exists a power over the lives of other men, and especially the lives of workers, which is destructive of all true progress. It leads inevitably
to that spirit of militarism of which the pernicious effects, as
developed in Germany, are now very visible to us.”

Despite their alarm at their situation, Liberals found themselves in a state of extreme consternation over the correct course of action. Although many Liberal and Nonconformist groups had passed resolutions in support of neutrality during the earliest phases of the war, the German invasion of Belgium so angered the British people that only “two ministers and one
under-secretary” actually resigned in protest, instead of the mass resignation which had once seemed likely. However, those who remained were very much divided by the handling of a war within a pacifist, rights-protecting ideology; some, “agreed to participate but sought to satisfy their anti-war proclivities by carrying on the struggle in a meagre and unsatisfactory way,” eventually leaving the Party because they saw it as too supportive of war or too eager to sacrifice individual rights. Meanwhile others threw themselves whole-heartedly into the war, regardless of Liberal beliefs, and many left the Party for the Conservatives because they felt the Liberals weren’t doing enough for the war effort. Others, including many ordinary Liberal constituents, simply stood and watched helplessly as their Party tore itself apart, still believers in the Liberals but unable to see any way to prevent the Party’s impending destruction.

Another group of Liberals went so far as to blame the British government for the war. Though at first many Liberals saw the war as a crusade for freedom from militarism and authoritarian rule, as the war dragged on, and the Party continued to waver indecisively along, many felt increasingly disillusioned and betrayed. They began to voice the same opinion revisionist historians would later advance: that England was responsible at least in part for the war because it had involved itself in the arms build-up and ventured from its traditionally fairly isolationist foreign policy to involve itself in the balance of power and tense rival alliances on the Continent. Philip Morrell, a Liberal M.P., stated in October 1916 that “I was opposed to the policy of the Triple Entente, which in my judgement was one of the principle causes
leading to war, and so far from thinking that the outbreak can be attributed to the exceptional wickedness of one nation or of one man, I held, and still hold, that whatever may have been the special guilt of Germany, which I do not for a moment extenuate or excuse, all the governments of the Great Powers of Europe, not excluding our own, were in different degrees responsible for the outbreak.” Some, such as P.A. Molteno, felt that “no vital interest [of England]...has been attacked,” and, while protests were certainly due, military involvement was not called for. They believed (at least before the war) that Germany would not annex Belgium, and even if it did, it would simply overextend itself through the need to subdue and control its newly acquired territory, and at any rate, without a powerful Germany, the Continent would only have exchanged the menace of Germany for that of Russia.

Party Leadership

Unfortunately for the Liberals, Herbert Asquith was not a leader suited to guiding them through these troubled times. George Dangerfield writes, “there were few men in England more gifted. Yet a certain lack of ardor...was altogether against him in a time when only inspired leadership could keep his Party on the heights...it then occupied....He was moderately imperialist, moderately progressive, moderately humorous...” Whether or not it was truly deserved, Asquith had a reputation for being less energetic than his countrymen might have wished. He was also seen as too often caving in to political pressure rather than performing actions based on what was needed for the war. Most Liberals were willing to place some temporary limitations on individual rights in the interests of better fighting, but they disliked Asquith’s actions because they felt he was doing so for reasons of “political manoeuvring” or because he was too weak to resist pressure from the Conservatives, rather than with the aim of aiding Britain’s troops. Under Asquith, the Defense of the Realm Act was passed, press censorship increased, the Paris Resolutions led to the Easter Rebellion in Ireland, and conscription was instituted, leaving
Liberals to wonder what truly remained to distinguish them from the Conservatives. Through what was perceived as his unwarranted and unprotesting sacrifice of individual rights, Asquith lost the support of Liberals who, though they supported the war, considered the protection of rights a higher priority than victory, and he gained a new set of critics from his own camp. Even those who agreed with Asquith’s policies were uncertain of his fitness as a leader in times of war. His term as Prime Minister witnessed failures in Gallipoli, Mesopotamia, Russia, Serbia, and Romania. The public also lacked confidence in his wartime advisors, who appeared indecisive even to their supporters.

However, though Liberals disliked Asquith for both his perceived failures as a wartime leader, and his apparent readiness to act contrary to Liberal doctrine, they felt that they couldn’t criticize him. He lacked the support of the Conservatives, who as Asquith’s power waned were hoping to establish a new, entirely Conservative government, not merely a Liberal government friendly to Conservatives. The resignation of many ministers created the need for a coalition government, but as Attorney General John Simon remarked prophetically, such a coalition would, “assuredly be the grave of Liberalism.” When in 1915 Asquith gave way before Conservative pressure yet again and formed a coalition government with them, he silenced his Party’s well-founded objections to this plan by threatening to resign if his Party refused to support him. Left with a choice between the known flaws of Asquith and the more dangerous, unpredictable Lloyd George, who they knew would have succeeded Asquith as Prime Minister, Liberal politicians opted to remain with Asquith, despite being trapped in a coalition with the Conservatives.

David Lloyd George was described by George Dangerfield as, “represent[ing], or seem[ing] to represent all those dangerous and possibly subversive opinions which Liberalism, in its grave game of progress, was forced to tolerate.” Beyond this, he was seen as disloyal, ambitious, and “openly intriguing for office.” Lloyd George also discomforted other Liberals because, though he certainly did not want the war (he was against participating in
it until Germany’s full-scale invasion of Belgium), he believed that if England was to fight it successfully, it had to devote all of its resources to the war, and not hesitate over issues like rights protection or pacifism. “It was not ‘my war,’” he wrote, “but being in it, I realised that the only safe way out was through the gates of victory, and that victory was only to be won by concentrating all thought and energy on the making of war.”

This belief meant that the policies he desired bore a great deal of similarity to those of the Conservatives, triggering worries that should he become Prime Minister, Conservatives would dominate the government and use the war as an excuse to do permanent damage to Liberal causes such as rights protection, Ireland, and labor. While Liberals complained of Asquith that he made concessions on issues such as conscription based on pressure, not need, as the Manchester Guardian explained on May 8, 1916, Liberals objected to Lloyd George’s limitations of rights because, so long as it brought him power, he didn’t seem to mind infringing on the people’s rights, or even hesitate to consider whether an infringement was truly necessary.

Of course, Lloyd George did eventually gain the power he desired, through the simple means of slowly lessening his support for Asquith, which the latter was dependent upon. To his credit, he did feel genuine patriotism, was a good war leader, and rather than eagerly snatching the post of Prime Minister, he suggested Bonar Law for the position before taking it himself, but it was no surprise when Bonar Law refused the post. Despite this gesture, there is little doubt that many of his actions before he came to power were calculated to bring him there, and had he chosen a different method of becoming Prime Minister, which did not involve the resignation of Asquith and the prominent Liberals who remained loyal to him, effectively splitting the Party in two, perhaps the Party would have been better equipped to overcome the obstacles it later encountered.

As it was, however, the Liberal Party was left deeply divided when the war finally came to an end. Liberal politicians who had turned against the war had often been repudiated by Liberal
voters in their own constituencies; some had resigned and quit politics entirely, others had left their old Party to work against it in the rapidly rising Labour Party, and some remained Liberals due to their belief in *laissez-faire* economics but criticized their Party on all of its other policies. The disunity in the lower levels of the Party was reflected in its leaders: Winston Churchill defected to the Conservatives after having been given an insultingly small office in Asquith’s 1915 coalition government as part of the deal with the Conservatives, Haldane turned to Labour after having been given no position whatsoever as part of that same deal, and many others defected, resigned, or lost their reputations, not the least of whom was Asquith himself. The powerful, united leadership, which had been one of the Party’s strongest assets entering the war, was no longer in existence.

By contrast, the Conservatives held as steady a position as ever on the British right, for the war had supported, rather than contradicted, their ideals, and Labour was also flourishing in post-war England. Even though Labour had taken part in the wartime coalition governments, it was not associated with them in the view of the public, since it had been independent and occasionally hostile to the parties it had worked with. Though this meant that it did not benefit from the support Lloyd George received after the Allied victory, its lack of association with the war proved immensely beneficial to them later, when Britain’s citizens began increasingly to blame their government for the war and all of the tragedy accompanying it, whereas Lloyd George and the Liberals were seen as tainted by failure.
Conclusion

Though the Liberal Party did experience some problems before the onset of World War I, none of them was so daunting that it alone could conceivably have led to the type of collapse the Party experienced during the 1920s. The issue that was potentially the most serious was that of their constituency including both workers and industrialists. However, in the years before the war, the Labour Party had barely been on the British political map, and had the issue not been so suddenly and dramatically aggravated, and the Party so split and weakened by war, it is certainly possible that the Liberals could have adapted to changing times and found a solution; perhaps, in time, they would have shifted further left, absorbing the Labour Party and its constituency rather than being displaced by it.

This does not mean, however, that the war itself made the Party’s destruction inevitable. It was the Liberals’ handling of the war that sealed their fate. The failure of the Liberal Party to adapt a cohesive, unified response to the war, while understandable, turned a bad political situation into a fatal one. The leadership of the Party displayed some of the worst mismanagement, first in Asquith, who wavered indecisively and failed to provide his Party with a strong stance behind which to unite, and then in Lloyd George’s self-serving rise to power, which served to weaken the Party further. Because of the faults of the Party’s two wartime leaders, the Party’s split was devastating and permanent. Had the Party adopted a unified platform for the war, it likely would have recovered the support of the Nonconformists, glad to have a solid position to support, and so would have weathered the war without the fragmenting that led to its demise.

However, adopting a common stance on the war was certainly more difficult for the Liberal Party than for any other Party that could have found itself in a similar situation. Caught between workers and industrialists, pacifism and patriotism, and rights protection and the war effort, there was little solid ground
for the Party to stand on. The success of the Liberals before the war may have actually been what caused the war to be so damaging to them; had the Liberals been the minority party when the war broke out, they would not have been wedged into nearly so many political corners. Instead of being forced to figure out a way to balance the demands of following their own ideology and fighting a war for themselves, they would have been able simply to reluctantly follow and criticize the party in power. This would have left them free of blame at the end of the war, as Labour had been fortunate enough to be considered, and able to avoid the contradictory pressures the war had presented them with, which eventually tore the Party apart.
2 Ibid., p. 16
3 Ibid., p. 17
4 Ibid., p. 17
5 Ibid., p. 16
6 Ibid., p. 18
8 Ibid., p. 792
9 Ibid., p. 792
10 Ibid., p. 798
11 Ibid., p. 796
12 Ibid., p. 799
13 Ibid., p. 802
14 Ibid., p. 802
15 Ibid., p. 802
16 Ibid., p. 803
17 Ibid., p. 803
18 Ibid., p. 804
19 Ibid., p. 805
21 Jason, Past and Future (London: Chatto and Windus, 1918) (full author’s name not given)
22 Wilson, p. 26
23 Ibid., p. 26
24 Ibid., p. 27
25 Ibid., p. 36
26 Ibid., p. 36
27 Ibid., p. 24
28 Ibid., p. 24
29 Murray to Sir Donald Maclean, July 29 1916, Elibank Papers, as quoted in Wilson (no page given)
30 Philip Morrell, a Liberal M.P., as quoted in Wilson, p. 32
31 Wilson, p. 49
32 Ibid., p. 27
33 Ibid., p. 39
34 Morrell, as quoted in Wilson, p. 30
35 Molteno, as quoted in Wilson, p. 30
36 Wilson, p. 30

Wilson, p. 39

Ibid., p. 39

Ibid., p. 34

Ibid., p. 35

Ibid., p. 39

Ibid., p. 40

Ibid., p. 40

John Simon, as quoted in Wilson, p. 23

Dangerfield, p. 18

Wilson, p. 41

Lloyd George, as quoted in Wilson, p. 36

Wilson, p. 41

Ibid., p. 43

Ibid., p. 45

Ibid., p. 43

Ibid., p. 31

Ibid., p. 46-47

Ibid., p. 29

Bibliography


Jason, *Past and Future* London: Chatto and Windus, 1918

